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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

\"X'ILLIAM f. SMITH and PATSY
SMITH, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
CARROLL REALTY COMPANY, a
Corporation, and
NATHANIEL A. SMITH,

Case No.
8892

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Appeal is from a Special Verdict of a Jury in the
Third District Court, awarding to plaintiffs damages in the
sum of $4,850.00 in connection with an exchange of property
of the plaintiffs in Salt Lake City, Utah, for property in Lava
Hot Springs and assumption of mortgage on the Salt Lake
City property. Defendants were real estate broker and salesman
for the plaintiffs.
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The Complaint alleges that plaintiffs are husband and
wife and that defendant, Nathaniel A. Smith, was a licensed
real estate salesman connected with the Carroll Realty Co.,
a real estate broker, at the time of the listing of the Salt Lake
City property of plaintiffs with defendants; defendants, as
agents of plaintiffs, negotiated an exchange of property with
Mr. and Mrs. Nick Kladis of Lava Hot Springs, Idaho, the
properties being valued at $23,500.00 for the Salt Lake City
property and $15,500.00 for the Lava Hot Springs property;
that plaintiffs directed the defendants to consult with qualified
persons in Lava Hot Springs, as to the value of the Kladis
property and that defendants falsely and fraudulently misrepresented the information received as to value and that
plaintiffs entered into the exchange relying on the false information and suffered damage in the sum of $8,000.00 (R. 1, 2).
An Amended Complaint added a Second Cause of Action,
alleging that defendants "negligently failed to exercise due
care in accordance with the standards of their profession to
determine the value of the said Kladis property" and alleged
damage as a result of such negligence at $8,000.00 (R. 9).
After the trial of the case, the plaintiffs waived their
claim on the basis of fraud and deleted the First Cause of
Action and added as an additional Count "the right to receive,
as damages, the commission paid in this case" (R. 272).
Defendants denied receipt of the commission made the
subject matter of the Third Cause of Action (R. 273) and
by Amended Answers took issue with the Second Cause of
Action (R. 15, 16, 17, 18). The First Defense denied the
alleged negligence (R. 15); the Second Defense pleaded
4
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estoppel of plaintiffs to plead neligence or reliance on the
defendants because the plaintiffs inspected the Kladis property
and in signing the exchange agreement waived any cause for
negligence against the defendants in making or failing to make
determinations of value (R. 15) ; the Third Defense pleaded
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs as a bar to their
action, well knowing the extent of the inspection and inquiry
made by the defendants of the Lava Hot Springs property
(R. 16); the Fourth Defense alleged that plaintiffs "assumed
the risk of disproportion in making the exchange of properties,
well knowing that no appraisal of etiher the Idaho or the Utah
properties was made" (R. 17); the Fifth Defense challenged
the alleged oral modification requiring defendants to determine
the value of the Kladis property as being void under the
Statute of Frauds (R. 18); and the Sixth Defense alleged
acceptance, approval, and ratification of the acts of defendants
by entering into the written exchange agreement and closing
the transaction on or about February 1, 1951 (R. 18).
At the first pretrial of the case the only issue presented
was whether a preponderance of evidence would be sufficient
to go to the jury (on the First Cause of Action) and to continue the pretrial (R. 7). At the second pretrial the plaintiff,
William F. Smith, admitted that his Salt Lake property was
listed with the Carroll Realty Company for sale or exchange
(R. 8) and there were no other pretrials which modified the
issues raised by the pleadings.
Following the trial of the case, defendants filed a Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict or for a New Trial
(R. 61-64) and then a Supplement to Motion for New Trial

5
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on the basis of newly discovered evidence, to which certain
documents were attached (R. 68-73) and which will be dis.
cussed more fully as part of the Statement of Facts.
The Court, in writing, made its Partial Decision on said
Motions (R. 74-77), holding open the question of new trial
for newly discovered evidence (R. 76) and, finally, denied the
said Motion For a New Trial (R. 79).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

William F. Smith, one of the plaintiffs, testified that he
bought the home at 3031 South 8th East, Salt Lake City, in
June of 1950 and listed the home for sale with Nathaniel A.
Smith at the price of $23,000.00, having previously been acquainted with Nathaniel Smith (R. 99). It is a rambler-type,
hip roof home on a large lot (R. 100). "It was advertised
regularly. There was a pretty fair attempt made to sell it.
* * * There may have been some discussion on something
other than less than 'the listed price,' but 'no offer was entertained ' " (R. 101).
In the autumn of 1950, shown a photograph of the Lava
Hot Springs property, "I said I certainly would not be interested in ever making a deal without seeing more than a photograph" and so William F. Smith and Nathaniel Smith went
to Lava Hot Springs around the 9th of December, 1950 (R.
102) . Theye were at the Kladis home in Lava Hot Springs
for two or three hours and "Mr. Kladis directed us through the
place'' and some interest in making a transaction was exhibited
(R. 103).

6
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On the return trip from Lava Hot Springs, the two Smiths
had "quite a discussion about it" and "at the time I felt that
I did not want to make the deal." He was interested in the
posibility of moving the property rapidly and Mr. Smith
thought it would be an easy task (R. 104). He felt that
$18,000.00 was too high for the Kladis property and "that we
could probably get $15,000.00 out of it" (R. 105).
Coming back, plaintiff said he wanted to find out more
about the property and that he needed money to pay the commission on this transaction as well as on an earlier transaction
that Nathaniel Smith had handled. Nate Smith thought he
could get Kladis to provide some cash on a mortgage and
$5,000.00 was discussed (R. 106, 107). Thereafter he kept
in touch with Mr. Smith periodically and about January 25,
1951 "we met at the Fletcher-Lucas office, first in a group
and then I had a discussion with Mr. Smith, privately. * * *
I asked him what he had found out * * * about the property
in Idaho. He said: 'Yes, from all I can determine, it looks
like a good deal to me' " (R. 108). "He said he had contacted a reliable source (R. 108). I had previously asked
him to find out from some reliable people in Lava Hot Springs
what the value of the property was and he had said he would
(R. 109). At the time of the trade the Eighth East home
had a mortgage of $7,500.00 on it and Mr. Kladis advanced
money on the Lava Hot Springs property to enable him to
pay the commission (R. 110). Kladis had moved into the
Salt Lake City property after renting the Lava Hot Springs
property from him for February, 1951 for $75.00, and then
it was vacant until April 20th while efforts were made to sell
the property (R. 111). Carroll Realty Office gave some assist7
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ance in renting the property and it was listed for sale with
the Pocatello Realty (R. 1.12), but he was unable to sell the
property ( R. 113) . The property was lost through foreclosure
of the Kladis mortgage for $3,000.00, the foreclosure being
for some $4,400.00 (R. 114).
After the noon recess, plaintiff Smith was asked again
about the conversations between the Smiths on the return from
Lava Hot Springs and plaintiff testified: "I said, 'Nate, I am
very much concerned about this transaction, and I don't know
anything about property values in Lava, so I want to rely upon
you to do that for me' "; that is, to make some investigations
concerning the property and "he said, 'Bill, I feel that I will
help you just as much as I can on this case, and I will do that
for you.' " (R. 115); and there was a further conversation
about this in the Fletcher-Lucas Office when Nate Smith said
he had made investigations and "it looked to me like it would
be a reasonable price to allow for that property at Lava,"
and plaintiff told him: "Nate, you know I rely on you-on
your judgment-and, if you say it is O.K., it is O.K. by me."
And in entering into the transaction he relied on defendant
Smith's statement about these investigations (R. 116). In the
latter part of February, 1954, the plaintiff made an investigation
at Lava Hot Springs to determine what had happened and
called on a banker, the manager of a Lumber Company, and
a Mr. Teeples, who operates a cleaning establishment and
was the L.D.S. Bishop (R. 117). Plaintiffs completed the
commission payments to the defendant Smith for the exchange
transaction and also the commission previously owed.
The exchange agreement was made Exhibit 1, and consummated by warranty deeds and mortgage, marked Exhibit 2.
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit 1 is as follows:
"EXCHANGE AGREEMENT"
"The Exchange Agreement Witnesseth: That the
undersigned, Nick Kladis, of the County of Bannock,
State of Idaho, hereinafter called the first party, hereby
offers to exchange the following described property,
situated in Lava Hot Springs, County of Bannock, State
of Idaho, to-wit:
180 x 110 feet of ground, together with all improvements thereon, located on Brooks Street, valued at
$15,500.00, free and clear of all encumbrance,
for property owned by W. F. Smith, of the County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereinafter called the second
party, situated in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, to-wit:
3031 South 8th East, consisting of 100 x 284 feet,
together with 1 share of Mill Creek Irrigation water,
valued at $23,000.00, subject to a mortgage of
$7,500.00 which the buyer of 3031 South 8th East
agrees to assume and pay.
Terms and Conditions of Exchange
Each party hereto shall supply an Abstract of title
for their respective properties described herein, within
30 days from the date this offer is accepted by the
second party, made by a bonded abstractor showing
the titles to said properties to be merchantable and
free from all taxes, assessments, liens or encumbrances,
except as herein mentioned and the hereinafter named
agent is authorized to procure and deliver said abstracts
of title. Each party shall pay for the abstracting of
title to the property to be conveyed by him and the
legal opinion rendered thereon.
Each party hereto shall execute and deliver, within
30 days from the date this offer is accepted, all instru-

9
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ments necessary to transfer the titles to said properties
and complete and consummate this exchange.
In the event errors appear in the titles to either or
any of said properties, then this agreement shall be
extended for a reasonable time and that the same may
be corrected. In the event any error cannot be corrected,
this agreement shall be null and void, except as to the
payment of commissions, unless the title to the property
affected is accepted subject thereto.
All taxes, insurance, rents and other expenses affect·
ing said properties shall be pro-rated from the date
this exchange is completed and consummated. Any
act required to be done may be extended not longer
than thirty days by the hereinafter named agent.
Fletcher-Lucas Investment Co., of Salt Lake City,
Utah, is hereby authorized to act as agent for all parties
hereto and may accept commission therefrom, and
should this offer be accepted by the second party, the
undersigned first party agrees to pay said agent the usual
and regular $775.00 commission for services rendered
to become due on the execution of this agreement by
all parties hereto.
It is also presumed and understood that all principals
to this agreement have investigated the respective
properties, and the agent or broker is hereby released
from all responsibility regarding valuation of same.

I have read (or have had read to me) this entire
agreement and understand the terms and conditions
contained therein.
Dated December 18, 1950.
s/ Nick Kladis
Witness:
s/ H. E. Baird
10
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Acceptance
I accept the foregoing offer upon the terms and
conditions stated, and the undersigned, hereinbefore
called the second party agrees to pay Fletcher-Lucas
Inv. Co., agent, of Salt Lake City, Utah, Eleven Hundred Fifty Dollars, ($1,150.00) commission for services rendered to become due on the execution of this
agreement by all parties hereto.
I have read (or have had read to me) this entire
agreement and understand the terms and conditions
contained therein. * * * * * * * * to include stoves
and heating equipment, subject to getting a $3,000.00
loan on Lava Hot Springs place.
Dated January 5, 1951
s/ W. F. Smith
Witness:
s/ N. A. Smith."
Exhibit 2 consisted of a warranty deed from Nick Kladis
and Yerda Kladis of Lava Hot Springs, to the plaintiffs,
dated February 1, 1951 and conveying the Lava Hot Springs
property. It also includes the warranty deed from the plaintiffs
to Nick and Y erda Kladis, covering the Salt Lake City property, subject to a mortgage for the balance of $7,500.00. It
also included a mortgage for $3,000.00 on the Lava Hot Springs
property to Nick and Y erda Kladis.
On cross-examination, the plaintiff Smith testified that he
was a life insurance agent and was 39 years old (R. 119) and
acquired the Eighth East home on a trade in a family transaction, his father having an interest in the Eighth East home
(R. 120). The Eighth East home was acquired on a trade for
,;_ grocery store valued at $14,500.00, the Eighth East home
] 1
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was valued at $22,000.00 and a mortgage of $7,500.00 on
it was assumed. No appraisal was made of either of those properties in the exchange, which was handled by Nathaniel A.
Smith and Carroll Realty (R. 122). Before making the trade,
he inspected the Eighth East property once and viewed it
twice from the outside and spent "not very long" in looking
it over. Title was taken in the names of him and his wife
(R. 123). In August, 1950, he borrowed $7,650.00 on the
home to refinance it, which refinancing produced no cash
but put the mortgage in his name and his wife's instead of
Mecham's, who had previously owned it (R. 125). The note
was payable on February, 1951 in the full amount of $7,650.00,
and by moving into the Eighth East home he could have
obtained some long term financing (R. 126). At that time
he was living in a home at 5755 Hanson Circle, which had
been purchased for $8,750.00 with a balance owing of $7,500.00
(R. 127}.
Exhibit 3 was a copy of the listing agreement on the
Eighth East home showing a mortgage balance of $6,765.00
on June 30th, which the plaintiff then recalled as the correct
balance, which was increased in August, 1950, to $7,650.00
upon application for a loan for a larger amount (R. 129). The
amount on the listing agreement, Exhibit 3, is $23,000.00
asking price, which amount was suggested by the defendant
Smith (R. 130).
The Eighth East home was surrounded mostly by vacant
property, with a mink ranch across the street, although it is
now built up into new homes. There were some people shown
through the property, but no offers to buy (R. LH, 132).
!2
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Exhibit 4, dated December 11, 1950 was received after
the trip to Lava Hot Springs, which was made on a Friday,
the 8th day of December (R. 133).
Exhibit 4 is on the same form as Exhibit 1 and offers to
trade the Lava Hot Springs property by Nick Kladis for
$18,000.00 on the Eighth East property at $23,000.00 and
assume a balance of $5,000.00, signed by Nick Kladis only,
with no acceptance. Exhibit 4 was not satisfactory because the
mortgage to be assumed was $5,000.00 and it actually was
$7,150.00 on the Eighth East home. He first saw Exhibit 1,
dated December 18, 1950 "when I signed it, which was January 5." It involves a difference in the mortgage assumed of
$7,500.00 and also a $3,000.00 loan on the Lava Hot Springs
property. The terms on Exhibit 1 were satisfactory, provided
the investigation of the Lava Hot Springs property was satisfactory (R. 135, 136). Defendant Smith tried to get Kladis to
loan $5,000.00 instead of $3,000.00 and signed it at $3,000.00
because the $5,000.00 could not be obtained. It was January
5, 1951 when the plaintiff Smith told defendant Smith he was
relying upon his investigation of the Lava Hot Springs property in making the agreement (R. 138). The plaintiff asked:
"Nate, did you ask-did you inquire of anyone in Lava as
I requested-namely,t he L.D.S. Bishop, as one? He said:
'Yes, I have, and, from what I could learn from him, he said
he felt that might be a fair price on that property, " and plaintiff said: "Nate, I rely entirely on you" (R. 139). From
January 5th to February 1st the transaction just waited for
dosing, there being some bad weather (R. 139).
On January 5th, when we met at the Fletcher-Lucas

13
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Office, plaintiff was told he was free to back out of the transaction, but this was not said after January 5th, after he signed
the agreement (R. 140).
William F. Smith handled the transaction. His wife did not
confer with any of the people (R. 141).
On the trip to Lava Hot Springs, plaintiff Smith had
looked through the inside and the outside of the Lava property
and he found it "in very probable condition at that time"
(R. 142) . He discussed with defendant Smith the possibility
of using it for a hotel or motel. Defendant Smith told the
plaintiff he was not familiar with properties in Lava Hot
Springs (R. 143) .
Plaintiff went to Lava Hot Springs with Mr. Carroll in
June, 1951 and in August, 1951.

"Q. Do you remember whether, on the day you went
to Lava Hot Springs with Mr. Smith, before you
parted, after you had returned to Salt Lake, you
signed an offer-a counter proposal of some kind?
A. No, I don't remember that.

Q. Do you recall whether there were any counter
offers made, other than the two I had shown you?
A. No.

Q. Did you originate any?

A. No.
Q. These two were both originated by Mr. Kladis,
weren't they?

A. Yes.
14
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Q. You don't think you made any counter proposal
to Mr. Kladis? You don't recall any?
A. No." (R. 148).

While in Lava Hot Springs, Mr. and Mrs. Kladis had
represented the Lava property very highly and placed the
value of $18,000.00 on it (R. 150). They compared it with
one or two other homes there which had recently been sold
and mentioned the prices (R. 150). Plaintiff did not tell them
he did not think their house was worth $18,000.00 (R. 151).
In the foreclosure action brought by the Kladis estate following
the death of Mr. Kladis, plaintiff filed a counter-claim, alleging that Mr. and Mrs. Kladis had defrauded him and that
they had represented that they had the opinion of a banker
and the L.D.S. Bishop as to values (R. 151, 154).

Fred F. Jensen testified for the plaintiff that he was a
retired real estate broker, having retired in March, 1954 (R.
162). There is a common practice or procedure upon which
a realtor determines market value of property which includes
consideration of the community, the building, depreciation,
the neighborhood, comparable transactions (R. 162-163). His
opinoin is that inquiring of a stranger by long distance telephone, the stranger being in the cleaning and dyeing business
is not the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence in determining market value, where the buyer has himself inspected the
property and the transaction being considered is an exchange
(R. 163-164).
On cross-examination Mr. Jensen testified that he had
been a member of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board only prior
to 1940 (R. 166) and that the procedure he described on
15
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direct examination was for making an appraisal of property.
He had been an appraiser for Home Owners Loan Corporation
and followed this procedure (R. 167). When properties are
being exchanged, it is frequent that both properties are inated and if the person making the exchange wants the value
determined, it should be done in the manner he testified (R.
169) . Sometimes exchanges are left without determination
of values knowing that both properties are inflated and both
parties feel they have made a good bargain (R. 170). Witness
has known William F. Smith ever since he was a kid and
knows his parents (R. 170) . On redirect Mr. Jensen testified that he had not appraised the Eighth East home, but
that the builder told him it cost $15,000.00 (R. 172).
Robert C. Banning testified for the plaintiffs that he is
a real estate broker from Twin Falls, Idaho (R. 89). He
visited the property of William F. Smith in Lava Hot Springs
some time in 1951 and made an inspection for the purpose
of determining market value (R. 91) and that the market
value would be between $7,000.00 and $8,000.00 (R. 91).
\Villiam F. Smith listed the property for sale, but he was not
able to sell it (R. 95). The property was listed by William F.
Smith at $16,000.00 (R. 96).

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS
1'\1rs. Yerda N. Kladis testified that she is the widow of
Mr. Kladis, who died February 28, 1951. She resides at 3031
South 8th East, having moved there from Lava Hot Springs
on or about the 15th of }.1arch, 1951. As administratrix of
his estate she foreclosed the mortgage of the Lava Hot Springs
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property against Mr. and Mrs. Smith. The condition of the
Lava Hot Springs property was good when it was traded to
the Smiths, with recent paint inside and out, grass and shrubbery. The Eighth East house was in not too good condition when
she moved into that. There were holes in the walls, it needed
painting, it needed to have the floors revarnished, the roof
graphite and oiled and the plumbing cleaned out (R. 181 to
183). She put a fence around the property, had awnings put
on and planted some more lawn, painting inside and outside
(R. 184).
She recalls a visit of Mr. Nate Smith and Mr. William
Smith to Lava Hot Springs, believes it was in January, 1951
(R. 184). At that time her husband had not seen the Eighth
East property. She saw it before the trade was made, but after
the Smiths had come to Lava (R. 185).
On cross-examination Mrs. Kladis testified that the Lava
Hot Springs property is still in the estate and is not being
rented. It was rented for about six months at $45.00 a month
(R. 187).

Hyrum E. Baird testified that he has been a real estate
salesman for 30 to 35 years and was employed by FletcherLucas Investment Company. He has been with them nearly
thirty years (R. 188). He obtained a listing on the Kladis
property in Lava Hot Springs, which is Exhibit 5, dated December 11, 1950 and had known Mr. Kladis for a little while
before that. He had been looking for a place for Mr. Kladis
in Salt Lake City and took Mr. Kladis to look at the Eighth
East property (R. 189). Exhibit 4 was also signed on December
11th and it was either on that date or a few days before that
17
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he and Mr. Kladis had looked at the Eighth East property.
They had discussed listing his Lava Hot Springs property
before that time but had never listed it until the matter of
the Eighth East possible trade came up (R. 190) .
He does not know where the original of Exhibit 4 is.
There were other offers made involving the exchange. Mr.
Smith made a counter offer and came into the office to make
a change from the $5,000.00 he was asking to $3,000.00 (R.
190). As he recalls it, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Kladis came
into his office to make the correction on the exchange agreement, as Mr. Kladis would not loan $5,000.00 on the property
and make the deal and that is when they changed to $3,000.00
(R. 191). At the time of closing Mr. Kladis had Mr. Diamant,
an attorney, present to represent him. Everyone seemed happy
at that time.
There is no rule in the real estate profession in Salt Lake
City that it is the agent's duty to determine correct values in
an exchange. Getting an appraisal is a matter for the parties
(R. 192).
On cross-examination Mr. Baird testified that he represented the Kladises in the transaction (R. 192).

Nathaniel A. Smith testified that he lives in Salt Lake City
and has been in the real estate business for t\YelYe years, first
as salesman and then as broker, and was licensed with Mr.
Wayne Carroll for a little over a year in 1950 and 1951
(R. 193).
No values were discussed by him and William Smith in
connection with the exchange of 3031 South Eighth East for the
18
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grocery store (R. 194). William Smith listed the property
with Carroll Realty and Mr. Carroll gave him credit for the
listing, as he had known Mr. Smith. He had no conversation
with Mr. Smith before the listing was taken (R. 195).
The property was shown but no offers were received until
the Kladis exchange came in. Mr. Smith came into the office
quite frequently and they discussed the price and the reasons
the property had not sold (R. 197-198).
The first offer from Mr. Kladis was Exhibit 4 on the
basis of $18,000.00 on the Kladis property and $23,000.00
on the Smith property, which was the premise Smith went to
Lava on (R. 198). They went in all of the rooms and inspected
the house generally, inside and outside, including the garages
and both were favorably impressed with the property. While
there, there was no conversation about values (R. 199). They
drove around the town and he advised Mr. Smith he was not
familiar with the Lava property and went to the Mineral
Springs, two or three short blocks away (R. 200).
On the return trip there was a lot of conversation about
the two properties and the exchange (R. 212).
I said to Mr. Smith: "Now, Mr. Kladis has made an
offer here, he has offered his place for $18,000.00. We cannot
take that. You do not have $18,000.00 equity in your place,
supposing it is being turned in on this deal at $23,000.00, but
assuming that he wll allow you $23,000.00 for your place
on Eighth East, you would have over and above the mortgage
approximately $15,500.00. Now, would you be willing to
accept his place in Lava and $15,500.00 and let him assume
19
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your mortgage on that Eighth East property" He said he
would, but he needed a little cash to pay off some obligations
and had promised his dad some money if he sold the Eighth
East place. He asked if I thought he could get a mortgage
on the Lava place of $5,000.00 and I suggested that Mr.
Kladis might give him a mortgage for that amount and let
him pay it back by renting the place or developing it if he
wanted to (R. 214). Smith said: "By golly, if I could do that,
if I could borrow some money on that Lava place that would
be a good deal and if we could turn that in and take it at
$15,500.00 on Eighth East, for $23,000.00, that would be
a good deal for me" (R. 214-215). Nate Smith said that
seemed like a good deal and he should take his wife and go
look the place over. Three or four times on the way down
he said he believed he would take that, if they could make
that deal. And so, upon return to Salt Lake, they went right
to Carroll's office and wrote up a counter offer at $15,500.00
instead of $18,000.00 and the counter proposal was signed,
but he doesn't have a copy of it, it was delivered to FletcherLucas' office to present back to Mr. Kladis. Mr. Kladis would
not loan the $5,000.00 but came back with another proposal
at $3,000.00. Smith's counter-proposal was at $23,000.00 for
Eighth East, $15,500. for Lava, and Kladis to loan Smith
$5,000.00 on a first mortgage, which was signed on the same
form as Exhibit 4 and delivered to Fletcher-Lucas. Exhibit 1
looks like the one Kladis submitted back after the counterproposal (R. 216). It might have been two or three days or
a week between Smith's counter-proposal and the new proposal signed by Kladis. It was signed by William Smith
January 5th in the Carroll Realty Office. The agreement v.ras
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read over carefully and Smith knew exactly what was in it.
The $5,000.00 offer was never returned and the one that came
back had $3,000.00 (R. 218). Between the time Exhibit 1
was offered on January 5th, he talked to Mr. Smith and told
him Kladis did not want to stall around and if Mr. Smith
did not want the deal, he was going to look for another place
as he wanted to get his family down here. During that period
of time he talked to Mr. Kladis as to whether Exhibit 1 was to
remain open and subject to acceptance by William Smith. One
conversation took place in the Fletcher-Lucas office at which
he and Mr. Smith, Mr. Baird and Mr. Kladis were present. Mr.
Kladis wanted to know whether the deal was going to be
accepted or not, if it was not, he wanted to be relieved of
it and go ahead and purchase another property. Smith asked
if Nick Kladis would raise the loan and Nick said: "No, that
is the best I will do." So Smith said: "Alright, I will take
tt" and it was signed. The two Smiths' went over to Carroll's
office to talk it over and sign it, and it was then that they
went over the contents of the terms and conditions of the
exchange "and I told Mr. Smith that this was a decision that
he would have to make. He had seen the property, and he
knew what the exchange called for, and considering all things,
it looked like a fair exchange" (R. 223-224). This was when
they read the contract together and they also read the contract
together the first time he signed one on the evening after they
returned from Idaho (R. 224). The agreement was read to
Smith, a paragraph at a time. He read this paragraph: "It
is also presumed and understood that all principals to this
agreement have investigated the respective properties, and
the agent or broker is hereby released from all responsibility
21
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regarding valuation of the same." And I said: "Now, you
understand that you have inspected the property, and Mr.
Kladis has inspected your property, and you are buying this
property on your own judgment?' And he answered: "I understand that" (R. 229). And they read together the acceptance
which recites: "I accept the foregoing offer upon the terms
and conditions stated, and the undersigned, hereinbefore called
the second party * * * . I have read, or have had read to me,
this entire agreemnt and understand the terms and conditions
contained therein." And he said he understood it and thereupon signed it and I witnessed it (R. 230-231). Nothing
was said at that time about information received from Mr.
Teeples. The conversation about that was the second or third
day after the trip to Lava. The day after the trip he called
Mr. Teeples, the L.D.S. Bishop, and got his report and reported
that to Mr. Smith one evening when he dropped in the office
(R. 231).
On their way back from Lava Hot Springs it was mutually
agreed that he should call the Bishop and see what he thought
about values (R. 231-232). After calling Mr. Teeples he
reported to Mr. Smith "that Mr. Teeples said he was not a
real estate man, but he was familiar with property in Lava,
he was in business there, and he thought that that property
was a little high at $15,500.00, but that on a trade for Salt
Lake property that would be another thing, as it might be a
fair exchange" (R. 23). Mr. Carroll was present at that conversation and it was never discussed again. He was still holding
out to see if he could get the $5,000.00 mortgage (R. 232).
At the closing of the transaction on or about February 1st,
22
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both parties expressed satisfaction with the deal, the documents
were explained, and the transaction was closed (R. 233-234).
He is of the opinion the store in Murray traded by Smith
and others for the Eighth East property was worth about
$6,000.00 (R. 234-235).
While the Eighth East property had been listed, he talked
to Mr. Smith about the price and told him: "If we get the
price down where it ought to sell, it will sell," and he suggested that we advertise it for a trade. So Mr. Carroll advertised
the property for trade and it was at that time that Baird from
Fletcher-Lucas called (R. 235-236).
On cross-examination Mr. Nathaniel A. Smith testified:
The Fletcher-Lucas Office got the commission of 5%
of $23,000.00 on the Eighth East house, which he approved
(R. 238), having received a portion of the listing commission

(R. 238).
As they returned from Lava Hot Springs they discussed
Smith's equity in the home of $15,500.00 and they wrote
up an offer which they don't have, since it was never returned
after Smith's counter-offer had been submitted. "He finally
said it was a good deal and he wanted to take it" (R. 239).
The next day, he called Mr. Teeples. This was after he had
signed the counter-offer (R. 239). After the call to Teeples
was reported to Mr. Smith, he said: "I have got a cushion in
that Eighth East place. I can come out on it alright" (R. 241).

C. Francis Solomon testified for the defendant that he
is a fee appraiser and a real estate broker. He appraised the
property at ?931 South 8th East, atfer a thorough examination
23
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and in accordance with standard appraisal technique (R. 202203). The value of the property as of February 1, 1950 was
$17,200.00 (R. 204). The value as of February 1, 1951 was
$19,200.00 (R. 227).
He is a past president of the Utah State Real Estate Association, acquainted with practices and customs of real estate
men in the area, with much experience in exchanges of property. There is no custom in this area which requires a real
estate salesman working on an exchange of properties, particularly where one is in an area with which he is not familiar,
to reduce the properties to dollar values and report that to
the customer (R. 207-208).

Wayne Carroll testified that he was unemployed due to
a heart attack and was formerly a real estate broker under the
name of Carroll Realty Company, a corporation (R. 249). At
the time he took the listing from the plaintiff on Exhibit 5,
he told Smith they could not get $23,000.00 for it and Smith
said: "We can always try" (R. 252). The closing papers
between the Smiths and Kladises were prepared under his
direction and he had several conversations with William Smith
(R. 252). He was present when Nate Smith reported to
William Smith the conversation with Mr. Teeples that Teeples
was not a real estate man and thought $15,500.00 '"as a little
high, but William Smith said he expected something like that
and did not seem surprised (R. 253). There was also discussion
about the fact that if it was a trade that would affect the price
(R. 254). The call to Mr. Teeples had taken place in the
Carroll Realty Office and he had heard Nate Smith's end of
it (R. 254).
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At the time the transaction was consummated, he gave
the deed on the Eighth East place to Bill Smith's wife and
Bill took it from her and said he did not want her looking the
papers over, just wanted her to sign them (R. 257). In the
summer of 1951 he went to Lava Hot Springs with William
F. Smith and examined the property formerly owned by Kladis
and formed the opinion that its value was $10,000.00 or
$11,000.00, which he discussed with Mr. Smith while they
were there and that it was useless to try to get $15,000.00 or
$16,000.00 out of it (R. 261). Smith said he had a cushion
there, but it was not enough (R. 262) .
He was formerly a member of the Salt Lake Multiple Listing Bureau and knows of no practice among realtors working
out exchanges under which estimates or opinions of value are
given to customers where exchanges are involved (R. 263).
On cross-examination Mr. Carroll said he was not sure
his appraised value of the Lava Hot Springs was given to
Mr. Smith but he did tell him the price of $15,500.00 or
$16,000.00 could not be realized from it (R. 265).
The deposition of Morris W. Teeples was published
(R. 86), in which Morris W. Teeples testified that he lives
at Lava Hot Springs and is in the dry-cleaning business (p. 2).
He owns no real estate in Lava Hot Springs and has not
engaged in real estate transactions there. He is a Bishop of
the L.D.S. Church and knows generally of the property formerly owned by Nick Kladis there. He had been in the Kladis
home twice prior to December, 1950 and remembers receiving
a telephone call about this property from Nathaniel Smith
in December, 1950, or January, 1951 (p. 2-4). Mr. Smith
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asked him if he was Bishop of the Ward and asked about the
property and what he figured it would be worth. Smith quoted
a price of $15,500.00 which he told him sounded high because
the building was poorly built and had no heating plant "and
I thought that the price was a little high," but after Smith
mentioned that it was to be a trade to be made on Utah property, he told him that would be different because maybe the
property in Salt Lake would be high enough to offset that
(p. 4-6).
The defendants then rested.
On rebuttal, William F. Smith testified that before this
exchange was worked out Nathaniel Smith did suggest a reduction of the price of the Eighth East home (R. 266).
On rebuttal, Nathaniel A. Smith testified only as to the
Murray Store, formerly owned by Smith (R. 268).
The Jury was instructed and after deliberating for some
time inquired whether in Group 3 plaintiff was singular or
plural (R. 279). The Jury came back again with a question
as to Group 4, Proposition A and B and stated their understanding that if Proposition A under Group4 is marked, the
verdict is returned to the Court and if they marked Proposition B, then they consider the final page. The Court confirmed this (R. 280).
The Jury later returned with the verdict with an X as to
Group 1, Proposition A; Group 2, Proposition A; Group 3,
Proposition A; Group 4, Proposition A; and nothing filled
in on Group 5 (R. 280) .
The Court stated that the effect of the verdict is for the
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defendant, no cause of action, "and that the scope of the
employment of the plaintiff of the defendant Smith was to
determine and report the reasonable value of the Kladis
property, that the defendant's Smith breach of that employment agreement was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's entry
into the exchange transaction, and that the entry was made
with full knowledge of all of the parties that the defendant
Smith had." All the Jury said this was its verdict, except Mr.
Ownby and he said he understood that it was a stand-off. The
Court said that was so, the parties would be left as they came
there. Mr. Ownby stated that was different than they imagined,
as they thought their verdict entitled the plaintiff to something. They thought the verdict would make a judgment for
the plaintiff. The other jurors indicated that they felt the same
way (R. 282-283). Mr. Ownby said that was really the reason
that they had come back the time before

(R. 283).

The jury then retired to further deliberate and returned
with the change in their cross on Group 4, placing it on Proposition B, and with Group 5 filled in for $3,700.00 and $1,150.00,
with seven signatures on the verdict (R. 284).
In support of the Motion for New Trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence (R. 63) there was the Affidavit
of H. E. Baird stating that he had looked for all documents
in the files of Fletcher-Lucas before the trial and that following
the trial the defendant Smith came and requested a further
search, whereupon additional papers were found

(R. 67),

which additional papers and documents included a letter to
Nick Kladis, written by Mr. Baird dated December 8, 1950,
enclosing a photograph of 3031 South 8th East, and inviting
27
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Mr. Kladis to come to Salt Lake and consider an exchange
(R. 69) ; a letter from Mr. Baird to Mr. Kladis dated December 16th, reporting that Mr. Smith had agreed to take
the Lava Hot Springs property and inviting him to come to
Salt Lake City to complete arrangements (R. 70); copy of an
exchange agreement dated December 11, 1950 which was a
copy of Exhibit 4 (R. 71); a document similar to Exhibit 4
and containing a counter-proposal signed by W. F. Smith
dated December 11, 1950 (R. 72); and an exchange agreement dated December 18, 1950 and signed by Mr. and Mrs.
Kladis and both plaintiffs and witnessed by H. E. Baird (R. 73).

ARGUMENT
This was a confused case. Although two pretrials were
held, there is nothing in the pretrial orders which indicate
what the issues were to be or how the case was to be tried.
The Second Cause of Action is ambiguous as to whether it
is ex contractu or ex delicto. The Third Cause of Action was
added orally after the trial was concluded and was plainly
an action in breach of contract for recovery of commission
paid. The Amended Answers raise issues in both contract and
tort and some of these defenses were added after the case
had been tried and submitted to the jury.
The line of demarcation between actions sounding in
contract and in tort is a dim and indistinct one. 1 Am. Jur.
on Actions, Sections 50, 51, 55. In this case the Second Cause
of Action appears plainly to sound in tort, and appellants
suggest that it was an action in tort for negligent performance
of a contract. The contract is essential to the cause of action,
28
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but the nature of the action 1s tortious performancf of the
contract.
The Third Cause of Action is mentioned as a simple
contract action for return of consideration due to breach of
contract, although it was never written by the plaintiffs and
all that exists is the oral statement made by counsel to the
Court after the Jury had left. "Comes now the plaintiff and
moves to amend the Complaint, setting forth as an additional
County the right to receive, as damages, the commission paid
in this case" (R. 272).
The Special Verdict submitted to the Jury by the Court,
although confusing, assumes a theory of negligent performance
of a contract, as much as anything else, although Group 2
sounds purely in contract and uses the phrase "breached his
employment agreement." But Group 3 refers to proximate
cause of the damage and seems closer to the tort theory of damage than contract.
As will appear in the development of appellant's arguments, the errors relied upon are more plain if the theory
of the action is in contract; and we shall, therefore, make the
unfavorable assumption that the theory of the action sounds
in tort because this Court could draw that conclusion.
POINTS RELIED ON
1. The Written Agreement did not require that defend-

ants determine values of exchange properties.
2. If there was an oral modification of the Written Agree-

ment, it was void under the Statute of Frauds.
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3. Negligent performance of a duty based upon a void
contract is not actionable.
4. The Court erred in refusing an instruction on contributory negligence or assumption of risk.
5. The signed Exchange Agreement waived the Second
Cause of Action.
6. Dismissal of the Count as to Fraud was an abandonment of plaintiffs' only tenable position.
7. There was a failure of proof as to the plaintiff, Patsy

Smith.
8. The Court erred in directing a verdict for the amount

of the real estate commission on the Eighth East home.
9. The Court abused its discretion in denying the Motion
for New Trial based upon newly discovered evidence.
POINT 1.
THE WRITTEN AGREElviENT DID NOT REQUIRE
THAT DEFENDANTS DETERMINE VALUES OF EXCHANGE PROPERTIES.
This is important because Nate Smith believed his obligation was as contained in the Written Agreement (R. 115, 231232), and because it is the necessary starting point for the
conversation between the two Smiths on the way back from
Lava Hot Springs. It must be remembered that the listing
agreement, Exhibit 5, was taken by Wayne Carroll from the
plaintiff, William F. Smith, and that there were no other
parties to that agreement.
30
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The Court instructed the jury that employment of a real
estate broker can be merely to find a person willing to exchange, "or he may employ a real estate broker to determine
the value of property being considered * * * " (R. 38).
Although this Instruction is true, it surely was an invitation to
the jury to find that the defendant Smith was obligated to
determine values, although the written agreement did not
require that.
The Court then instructed the Jury that the agreement
of employment was contained "in the listing agreement and
any modifications thereof, entered into subsequently by the
parties either orally or in writing," (R.39), which is a further
invitation to the Jury to find that the defendants were obligated beyond the listing agreement. And then Instruction No.
9 was: "If a real estate broker is employed to determine
the value of a piece of property, he is bound to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence" (R. 40). This again is true
but it is misleading and is a strong invitation to the Jury to
find for the plaintiff. Appellants admit that a broker is bound
to exercse reasonable care, skill, and diligence in his employment. But the Instruction emphasizes care only in connection
with determination of value, the requirement of which was a
controverted issue. Then, Instruction No. 10 refers to the relationship of salesman and client "as one of confidence and
trust" and requiring "the utmost good faith at all times, and
to make full and complete disclosure of any and all information he had which would materially affect the interest of his
client" (R. 41). In view of the conflicting evidence which
was before the Jury, it would be hard for the Jury not to
find for the plaintiff if it paid any attention to these four In-
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structions. And Instruction No. 10 doesn't refer to value, but
to any information.
What then was the written agreement ?
Exhibit 5 is the standard listing agreement such as was
before this Court in Reich vs. Christopulous, 123 U. 137,
256 P. 2d, 238 at 239. In that case and under that listing
agreement this Court held that the real estate agent "had a
duty to represent their interest in good faith, to discharge it
with reasonable skill and diligence, and to disclose to them
all peritnent facts which would materially affect their interest."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The nature of the relationship is, therefore, established
by this Court, but that is not to read into the listing agreement
any obligation to determine values of properties. In Frye v.
Levanger, 76 Idaho 252, 281 P. 2d 134, the Idaho Court
observed that requiring reasonable skill and care does not
impose upon a real estate agent duties or responsibilities
beyond those expressed or implied by his contract of employment. And in Coe v. Ware, 40 Minnesota 404, 42 N.W. 205,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a requirement that
real estate agents determine facts as to value will not be
inferred in the absence of evidence that it was included in
the employment. In this record there is silence as to any
requirement of determination of value in connection with the
signing of Exhibit 5 by the plaintiff, William F. Smith.
The plaintiffs attempted to prove that determination of
value is made as a matter of custom by real estate brokers in
Utah. Fred F. Jensen, a retired real estate man, responded
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to leading questions that there is a common practice by which
realtors determine market values of property (R. 162). This
witness then proceeded to explain how he appraises property
and testified that the procedure he had described about examining properties amounted to an appraisal (R. 166). He did
not testify that the listing agreement required or contemplated
determination of value, but only how such determinations are
made. He was a member of the Multiple Listing Bureau of
Salt Lake City before the year 1940 (R. 166), which was too
remote to be effective as to present practices. The witnesses,
H. E. Baird (R. 192), Wayne Carroll (R. 263), and Francis
Solomon, ~ormer president of the Utah Association of Real
Estate Boards (R. 207-208), all testified that in making exchanges there was no custom or practice or requirement arising
from a listing agreement that properties be appraised.
Indeed, the evidence in this case was devoted in large
part to the testimony between the two Smiths as they drove
back from Lava Hot Springs in an effort to determine whether
there was a special agreement applicable in this case and,
if so, what was that agreement. It seems plain from the
instructions, the contract, the evidence, and the positions of
the parties that there is no showing here that Exhibit 5
required determination of values before an exchange could be

made.
POINT 2.
IF THERE WAS AN ORAL MODIFICATION OF THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT, IT WAS VOID UNDER THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
33
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Group 1 of the Special Verdict included this Proposition
A: "The scope of the employment agreement required the
defendant Smith to determine and report the reasonable value
of the Kladis property." The Jury found this Proposition

(R. 51).
An oral modification of a written agreement within the
Statute of Frauds must also be written to be valid. The trial
court, in effect, found this to be the law and said:
"The Court tentatively is of the opinion that such
is the fact, but is of the opinion that the agent was
bound by the written agreement of employment to
disclose to his principal what he had learned concerning the value of the property and that a breach in that
respect was a breach of the written agreement, and
on this ground the motions are denied."
This statement goes off on a tangent. The defendant Smith
either was or was not required, as a matter of agreement, to
obtain and report certain information. If there was such an
agreement, it was void. Appellants were entitled to an instruction to that effect. Failure to give such an instruction was
prejudicial for the very reason outlined by the Court (R. 75).
After building up the scope of the employment to include
determination of value by Instructions numbered 7, 8, 9, and
10, and after including the scope of the employment agreement as modified by the oral agreement, in the Special Verdict,
Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, and Group 4, it is a strange thing
for the Court to rule, in passing on the Motion for New Trial
and for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, that the oral
agreement was meaningless, since the written agreement
34
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required disclosure of the information, whether it was within
the agreement or not.

If the oral agreement was void because of the Statute of
Frauds, there should have been no reference to a possible
oral agreement in any of the Instructions or in any part of
the Special Verdict, and the Jury should have been instructed
on the theory that there was a written employment agreement
which required that important information obtained in the
course of the transaction be reported to the employer. That
would have made meaningless all of the testimony and all
of the argument about whether there was an oral agreement
requiring the defendant to do something, for breach of which
damages were to be imposed on the defendant.
This question is the subject of a series of annotations
appearing at 17 ALR 10, 29 ALR 1095, 80 ALR 539, and
118 ALR 1511. In the 80 ALR and 118 ALR annotations
Utah cases are cited as supporting the doctrine that a contract
required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing cannot be
modified by subsequent oral agreement. This appears to be
the general rule. The Utah cases cited are: Combined Metals
v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535, 267 P. 1020, 1031-1032, and Bamberger Company v. Certified Productions, 88 Utah 194, 48
P. 2d 489, 491. Appellants admit that if fraud were alleged
and supported, the Statute of Frauds could not be pleaded as
an instrument to defraud a person who had relied on the
oral modification in rendering performance. But that is not
the situation here. In fact, the agreement relied on by the
plaintiffs as requiring determination of value, was not so
much a modification, as an additional agreement imposed upon
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the real estate broker. There was no new or additional consideration, and the party who rendered the performance or
the purported performance of the modified agreement was the
defendant Smith and not the plaintiff. We have, therefore,
none of the elements of fraud or estoppel to modify the general
rule of these cases.
In the Combined Metals case this Court holds that where
there is no new or independent consideration and there are
additional duties imposed, the Staute of Frauds requires a
modifying agreement to be in writing.
In the Bamberger case the Court recognized the general
rule "that a contract required by the Statute of Frauds to be
in writing cannot be modified by subsequent oral agreements."
The Court goes on to observe that this principle cannot be
employed to perpetrate an injustice and to offer an asylum
to a person who has rendered performance in reliance upon
the modification. But, again, that is not the case here. The
Jury apparently found that there was a modification of the
written agreement, but there was obviously no new or additional consideration. The plaintiffs rendered no performance
of this modified agreement, the denial of which would work
a fraud upon him. It is a case where the one who received
the performance is attempting to allege inadequacy of the
performance and refuses to be bound by the Statute of Frauds
m showing the measure of the performance required. If defendant should be accused of leading plaintiffs into a trap
and using the Statute of Frauds as a cloak, the plaintiffs should
allege and prove the fraud by clear and satisfactory evidence.
Different portions of the Statute of Frauds demand differ36
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ent treatment. Contracts not to be performed in a year may
be taken out of the Statute by part performance, else it would
be inequitable. But the requirement that employment of a
broker connected with purchase of real estate must be m
writing must not be taken out of the Statute of Frauds by
part performance, or the provision of the Statute would be
meaningless. Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335.
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to establish definitely
and in writing the terms of the employment. To permit
departure from this requirement, except to avoid fraud, would
defeat the purpose of this Statute. See Knight v. Chamberlain,
6 Utah 2d 394, at 399, 315 P. 2d 273; also Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 593.

POINT 3.
NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY BASED
UPON A VOID CONTRACT IS NOT ACTIONABLE.
The Court assumed that negligence in performing a contract need not be concerned with the Statute of Frauds and
so the Instructions on negligence were made without reference
to whether the agreement as to making inquiry or determining
value was in writing.
In A. A. Easton v. Milton S. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386,
391-392, 295 P. 2d 332, this Court seems to have passed on
that question:

"If an action sounding in tort were allowed in every
instance where the contract was unenforceable because
not in writing, and barred by the Statute of Frauds,
the Statute would be rendered meaningless. As stated
37
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•

in 37 CJS, Frauds, Statute of, Section 224: ' * * * The
operation of the Statute is not confined to cases where
an action is brought directly on the contract. Whatever the form of the action may be, if the proof of
promise or contract within the Statute is essential to
maintain it, there can be no recovery unless the Statute
is satisfied * * * . Even an action sounding in tort may
be barred by the Statute, where an essential element
of the cause of action is an oral contract within the
Statute; but where the oral contract or representation
is a mere circumstance or incident of a fraud, it may
be shown in an action in tort for damages, as the
Statute has no application to such a case.' "
POINT 4.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AN INSTRUCTION ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF RISK.

•

Appellants raised the defense of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk in the Amended Answer (R. 13-14),
which was filed six weeks before the trial. Plaintiffs also
requested instruction to the Jury on the issue of contributory
negligence (R. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30).
The Court treated the evidence as though defendant'
Smith had learned from Morris Teeples that the Lava Hot
Springs property was grossly overvalued for the purpose of
the exchange. Had such been the fact, the failure to disclose
it would have been a fraud upon the plaintiff and the cause
of action for fraud could safely have been left in the case.
Plaintiffs dismissed the First Cause of Action because it was
obvious that Nate Smith had not deal fraudulentlr and that
38

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

if there had been any shortcoming at all, it would have to
be classed as negligence or an oversight.
We know that Nate Smith learned from Morris Teeples
from four sources: Mr. Teeples' deposition, Nate Smith's
recital of the conversation, Wayne Carroll's recital of one
end of the telephone conversation and the relating of the
conversation by Nate Smith to William Smith, and William
Smith's recollection of what Nate Smith told him.
Morris W. Teeples testified in his deposition that he
was a dry cleaner and as to the property owned by Nick
Kladis he knew nothing but the location and had been in it
twice before the telephone call, for a few minutes each time
(R. 86 page 3) . Teeples did not know what the property was
worth "and then when he quoted the price, $15,500.00, I told
him it sounded high to me and when its inclusion in a trade
was mentioned I told him that would be different because
maybe the property here would be high enough to offset
that" (R. 86, p. 5). Nate Smith testified that he told the
plaintiff "that Mr. Teeples said he was not a real estate man,
but he was familiar with property in Lava, he was in business
there, and he thought that that property was a little high
at $15,500.00, but that on a trade for Salt Lake property that
would be another thing, as it might be a fair exchange" (R.
233). The discrepancies between the Teeples statement and
the Smith recital of it seems to be to make Teeples familiar
with property in Lava and insertion of the word "little" in
referring to the price of $15,500.00 as being high.
Wayne Carroll testified that Nate Smith told William
Smith that Teeples was not a real estate man and thought
39
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$15,500.00 was a little high, but William Smith said he
expected something like that and did not seem surprised (R.
253).
William Smith testified that Nate Smith told him: "I
asked him what he had found out about the property in Idaho
and he said: 'Yes, from all I can determine, it looks like a
good deal to me.' He said he had contacted a reliable source"
(R. 108). Again, Nate is described as saying: 'The L.D.S.
Bishop had been contacted and Smith 'felt that that might be
a fair price on that property and was satisfied that that would
be a fair price.' ''
There is no evidence that defendant Smith ever told
William Smith that Teeples was a real estate man or knew
values or gave him any misstatement as to what Teeples had
told him. Nate Smith gave his opinoin to the plaintiff, included
in which was his conversation with Teeples. If that was misrepresentation, it was fraudulent. If Nate Smith was negligent
in making that statement, then William Smith was negligent
in relying on it, since there was no indication that Teeples'
opinion was probative or that Nate Smith's opinion was
corroborated by substantial facts. Plaintiff had inspected the
property and had made a counter-proposal before the Teeples
conversation was related to him, according to Nate Smith's
testimony (R. 224, 239) and according to the documents
included in the Motion For New Trial (R. 72). Plaintiff
was negligent if he accepted Smith's recommendation as an
opinion that the Lava Hot Springs property was worth $15,500.00 cash.
In Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P. 2d 623, this
40
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Court quoted from Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P. 2d
865, as follows:
"No matter how naive or inexperienced the defendants were, they could not close their eyes and
accept unquestioningly any representations made to
them. It was their duty to make such investigation and
inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances
would dictate; whether this required them to make
further inquiry concerning the income, and if so, the
extent thereof was for the jury to determine.''
The law is plain that contributory negligence or contributory
fault of a principal can defeat his action against an agent or
broker, and the facts in this case were such that defendants
were entitled to have the Jury know this principle of law.
Section 415 of the Restatement of Agency thus states
the principle:
"The liability of the agent to the principal may be
avoided, terminated, or reduced, by a breach of contract
by the principal, his contributory fault, or his failure
to mitgate damages."
The illustrations given are where a principal knows a fire
insurance policy has not been cancelled, as requested, or
knows that the agent has not paid money over, as required.
The same principle is announced in Section 162 of 3 CJS on
Agency. The discussion in 23 Am. Jur., page 948, 960-961,
makes the rule plain. This is in the title on fraud and indicates
that contributory negligence is plainly available as a defense
in actions involving representation of facts, except where there
is fraud and here there is a division of authority because of
a conflict in interest to punish those who use fraudulent means
41
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to accomplish their ends and to require of a person seeking
assistance that he will have used due care; but unless fraud
is charged, the defense of contributory negligence accords with
the policy of the law. See also Salem vs. DeWitt-Jenkins Realty
Co. (Ohio App.), 113 N.E. 2d 918, where the plaintiff gave
the agent a faulty description and then failed to check on
whether the agent had verified the description; Moore v.
Coler, 99 N.Y.S. 846, 114 App. Div. 301, where plaintiff relied
on representations concerning bonds about which he had
means of knowledge; Benton v. Roberts (Ga. App.), 134
S.E. 846, where the principal could have avoided loss through
ordinary care in determining whether loans of money were
secured; Fort Valley Coca Coca Co. vs. Lumbermen's Mutual
Insunrance Co., 69 Ga. App. 120, 24 S.E. 2d 846, 851, where
it was held the plaintiff should have examined his policy of
insurance and not relied on the agent's statement as to what
it contained; Lawrason v. Richard, 135 So. 29, 172 La. 696;
and Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P. 2d 1075, both
involving automobile accidents; Schneider vs. Suhrman (No.
8716 ____ Utah ____ , ____ P. 2d ____ ,where supplier should have
known that retailer might not cook pork products.
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P. 2d 134 at 137,
contains a discussion similar to that from 23 Am. Jur. (supra).
This Court there observed that contributory negligence will
seldom be allowed as a plea to a wilfull wrong, indicating
that against the plea of negligence in making statements of
fact, contributory negligence such as failure to read a document will defeat recovery unless fraud is involved. And
although it is not a square holding involving a plea of contributory negligence, this Court applied the principle of con·
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tributary fault in Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 267, 367,
300 P. 2d 623, where the court considered cancellation of the
contract for misrepresentation or misapprehension as to fact
and in refusing cancellation to the defendant observed:
"He spent no time obtaining independent advice
as to the value of the farm and, even though he was
told by the seller that there was a water loss between
the source of the creek and the ranch, he did not
investigate how much loss occurred or the cost of
preventing the loss. Under these circumstances, the
trial court made the finding that there was no fraud
involved * * * ."
Clay v. Dunford, supra, explains the difference between
contributory negligence and the assumption of risk existing
where there is a known danger to which one voluntarily subjects himself.
In a brief annotation at 62 ALR 1357, 1360, entitled
"Skill and Care Required of Real Estate Broker," the rule is
also stated that in the absence of special circumstances "the
principal has been held to be barred from recovering for the
agent's negligence by contributory negligence."
The issue of contributory negligence was plainly raised,
instructions were requested, and it surely is negligent to rely
on any off-hand opinion of an L.D.S. Bishop as to whether
a proposed exchange should be made, where there is no evidence that the L.D.S. Bishop knows anything about the one
property, and cannot possibly know anything about the other
property. Under the instructions given, the jury was permitted
to penalize the defendant as to all of plaintiff's theoretical
damage, if it could find that any statement made by the L.D.S.
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Bishop was not accurately and completely related to the
plaintiffs, regardless of whether Nate Smith believed the
opinion of the L.D.S. Bishop to be significant, and regardless
of the right of the plaintiffs to let such a person and such a
conversation be a substitute for determination of value. And all
of this is in the atmosphere of exchange of properties far removed from each other, where the real question is not so much
the value of a particular piece of property, but comparative
values, coupled with the fact that the owner of the Lava property
owned his outright and was willing to assume a mortgage
on the other property, and was also willing to loan cash to the
plaintiffs, which happened to be a much needed item.
All of this was known to the parties. Plaintiff saw ·the
property and knew no appraisal was made. He did not inquire
as to the competency of the L.D.S. Bishop or the source of
Nate Smith's inquiry. He preferred to go ahead and assumed
the risk of proceeding blindly. He was guilty of contributory
neligence and this proposition should have been given to the
Jury. (See Cole v. Parker, supra, at p. 268).

POINT 5.
THE SIGNED EXCHANGE AGREEMENT WAIVED
THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.
The particular clause of the contract (Exhibit 1), relied
upon by the Appellant, reads:
"It is also presumed and understood that all principals to this agreement have investigated the respective
properties, and the agent or broker is hereby released
from all responsibility regarding valuation of same.''
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The trial judge ruled in Point II of his Partial Decision
on Motions that the defendants' failure to disclose an opinion
as to the value of the property presented an action on which
a claim could not be waived by contract (R. 75). The failure
to disclose an opinion sounds like fraud, but of course there
were no instructions on fraud and the First Cause of Action
was dismissed. The Court, therefore, must have had in mind
that a waiver of negligence or a cause of action for negligence is contrary to public policy. This is the subject of an
annotation at 175 ALR 8 and where applied to future negligence, the rule is admitted to have some force. This Court
has recognized such a rule in Allen v. Southern Pacific Co.,
117 Utah 171, 213 P. 2d 667; Jankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah
325, 54 P. 2d 425; Brooks v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
26 Utah 147, 72 P. 499. But we are not here concerned either
with fraud or with anticipated negligence. The question here
is whether an existing cause of action, based upon negligence
or breach of a contract, can be waived by the execution of a
contract containing the waiver. Such a contract will be upheld
in the absence of fraud. Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah
432, 19 P. 2d 389; Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. vs.
Kay, 81 Ctah 595, 21 P. 2d 836, B. T. Moran, Inc. vs. First
S:ecurity Corporation, 82 Utah 316, 24 P. 2d 384 (see 10
ALR 1432). Those cases involved sales of personal property
wherein clauses in the contracts stated that the contracts were
complete, and warranties or oral representations and actions
thereon were waived by the parties. This seems to be the
principle involved in the execution of Exhibit 1. The document containing the waiver was signed by the plaintiffs on
January 5th, after any claim of reporting the Teeples con45
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versation. Whether the signed agreement filed with the Motion
for New Trial (R. 73) was signed after a report of the Teeples
conversation, would have to be determined in a new trial.
This principle, in the absence of fraud, is well established.
See 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 182.

POINT 6.
DISMISSAL OF THE COUNT AS TO FRAUD WAS
AN ABANDONMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S ONLY TENABLE POSITION.
The action was tried on the theory that the plaintiffs were
attempting to prove fraud, both as a means of getting around
the Statute of Frauds and as a means of setting aside the
exchange agreement with its waiver of conduct of the broker.
Defendants also had pleaded laches in bringing the action.
This matter had been discussed at pretrial and the instructions
of the Jury with fraud in issue would have had to involve
a different burden of proof from that for negligence or breach
of contract. It was plain from the Court's instructions to the
Jury that fraud was not an element in the plaintiffs' case.
Defendants have taken the position by their pleadings
and at the pretrial and at the trial that unless fraud can be
proved, plaintiffs cannot make out a cause of action. If this
Court comes to the same conclusions, upon consideration of
the foregoing points and arguments, the plaintiffs will not have
lost their case, but will have opportunity to retry the case
on the theory of fraud and perhaps upon the theory of negligence with appropriate provision for contributory negligence,
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if the Statute of Frauds can be satisfied and if plaintiffs did
not waive their cause of action against the broker.
POINT 7.
THERE WAS A FAILURE OF PROOF AS TO THE
PLAINTIFF, PATSY SMITH.
The plaintiff Patsy Smith did not testify and entered
not at all into the preliminary transactions, except to be
prsent when the transaction was consummated (R. 141 and
257) and to sign Exhibit 1. She was, however, mentioned
as one of the owners of the property on Eighth East (R. 123,
124, 125). The Jury noted that in Group 3, Proposition A,
the word "plantiiff" was singular and in Proposition B it was
plural (R. 53). The Jury was instructed that in both cases the
word was plural.
It is plain that Patsy Smith was not a party to the listing
agreement (R. 250) and was not a party to the conversation
on the return trip from Lava Hot Springs. She simply went
along with her husband, who stated that she was not supposed
to have an opinion on the sufficiency of the transaction, but
was only supposed to sign (R. 257). Did this establish a
cause of action in favor of Patsy Smith?
Patsy Smith did not sign Exhibit 1, which was the exchange agreement, and at the time it was signed the two Smith
men went to another room where they discussed, among
other things, the two properties (R. 149). Wayne Carroll
took the listing agreement from W. F. Smith, with no mention
of Mrs. Smith (R. 250, 251, 264). William F. Smith stated
that he listed the property (R. 128, R. 99, 100).
47
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The failure to establish any evidence in favor of Patsy
Smith was one of the bases for the Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding Verdict (R. 61). In denying the Motion on
this ground, the Court stated that it was of the opinion that
Patsy Smith joined in the listing agreement, and so the Motion
was denied (R. 76-77). The error of the Court in making
this assumptoin suggests that if the Court had had the facts
and the transcripts available and in mind, the Motion would
have been granted on this ground.
Mrs. Patsy Smith was a co-owner of the Eighth East
property. Title was taken in the name of husband and wife
(R. 123, 124, 125) and it can only be presumed that the
interests of husband and wife were equal, 48 CJS 930, 932.
The general rule is that a tort committed upon one person
furnishes no cause of action in favor of another. 39 Am. Jur.,
Parties, Section 10; 38 Am. Jur., Title Negligence, Section 21
at page 662; Central Georgia Power Co. v. Pope, 141 Ga. 186,
80 S.E. 642, LRA 1916 (d), 358. This general rule is recognized in cases where third persons claim damage from negligent work of independent contractors. Berg v. Otis Elevator
Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 P. 832; Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68
Utah 85, 249 P. 437. The only basis for liability in that type
of case is where the contractor knew that there was imminent
danger and also knew that persons such as plaintiff would
use the dangerous instrumentality. In the instant case there
was no evidence what~ver that Mrs. Patsy Smith even knew
of the conversation between the two Smiths on the way back
from Lava Hot Springs or that she even knew that the property
had been listed with Carroll Realty Company. There was no
48
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testimony of any kind that she relied on any statements made
by Nate Smith or that her husband ever advised her that Nate
Smith had informed him that the difference between the
properties at fair value was represented by the mortgage on the
Eighth East property.
Had there been a claim of fraudulent representation by
Nate Smith, the law will permit a damaged third party to recover for the fraudulent representation. 8 Am. Jur., Title
Brokers, Section 135, page 1062.
POINT 8.
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT
FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ON THE EIGHTH EAST HOME.
The Court withdrew this question from the Jury and,
in effect, included it as additional damages to the plaintiff, in
the event the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiffs on
other grounds (R. 43 and 55). The Court considered this
to be a real estate commission paid to the defendants and
characterized it as a refund (R. 55). The evidence was specific
that this $1,150.00 was paid to Fletcher-Lucas Company and
not Carroll Realty Company (R. 238). This Third Cause of
Action was inserted after the trial upon oral motion (R. 272),
and appellants promptly denied that they had received the
commission (R. 273). And appellants took exception to the
giving of Group No. 5 for the reason that the $1,150.00 had
not been received by the Appellants (R. 277), and took exception to the giving of Instruction No. 12 for the same
reason (R. 278).
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If the exchange had been found proper and involving
no breach of contract, the plaintiffs would have been out
of pocket the $1,150.00. The Court instructed the Jury that
the damage of the plaintiffs, if they were allowed to recover
anything, was the difference between the value of the two
houses, reduced by the assumed $7,500.00 mortgage. This was
all of the damages of the plaintiffs and would have made
plaintffs whole. Adding the $1,150.00 amounted to additional
damage or double damage and made the plaintiffs better off
by reason of the breach. The loss on overestimating the valuation was found at $3,700.00 (R. 55 and 59). Instruction No.
12 advised the Jury that there were two items of damages.
The first was for $1,150.00, and the second one was to be
derived by determining market value of the equity of plaintiff
in the Eighth East home and subtracting the fair market value
of the Kladis property from that. The remainder, if any,
would be the amount of damages plaintiffs suffered. This
latter measure of damages was all plaintiffs were entitled to.
"A person injured by the commission of a tort is
entitled to actual pecuniary compensation for the
injury sustained, and except where the circumstances
are such as to warrant the allowance of exemplary
damages, he is limited to such compensation. He is not
to be placed in a better position than he would have
been in had the wrong not been done." 15 Am. Jur.
on Damages, 470.
In Briece v. Bosso (Mo. App.), 158 S.W. 2d 463, the Court
held that where an exchange of real estate is based upon
misrepresentation of market values and damages are awarded
to the deceived person, the measure of damages is the difference
between the market value and the value as represented. That
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is the measure of damages contained in Instruction No. 12,
without the commission of $1,150.00 which would place the
plaintiffs in a better position than if there had been no representation.
In Isaacs v. Frank Meline Co. (Cal. App. hearing denied
by Supreme Court) 37 P. 2d 1045, 1047-1048, the California
Court seems to have passed upon this precise question. In
that case there had been an exchange of land for a worthless
note and trust deed, the value of which had been misrepresented. The value of the land was found to be $13,500.00 and
judgment was given for that amount and also for the amount
of commission paid in the sum of $1,119.00, for $90.00 escrow
fee, and $10.00 for title search. The Court upheld the contention of the appellant that these were not proper items of
damages, which should have been measured by the value
of what she gave for the worthless note and trust deed.
"The value of her equity in the property she traded
was, according to her own testimony, $13,500.00. Had
she received this amount with the interest on the
Spears' note, she would have had no cause of action
for the commission and other items she paid. Having
been made whole, as it were, on her deal by the judgment for the value of her equity, and interest thereon,
this would seem to be the full amount of the detriment
suffered by her, because the Spears' note and trust deed
was not what Roberts represented it to be."
POINT 9.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
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In the trial of the case there were three real controversies:
1. Was there an agreement between the Smiths that Nate
Smith would obtain information from Lava Hot Springs, as to
the value of property?
2. In reporting this information to the planitiff Smith,
was there a negligent representation, a fraudulent representation, or a reasonable representation? And,
3. What was the value of the respective properties?
The plainti.J.-'f contended that he relied implicitly on Nate
Smith to obtain some information about the value of the
property and report it to him and that he made no counter
offer until he had received the report from Nate Smith (R.
108, 115, 116,a nd 15 0) . Nate Smith, on the other hand,
testified that on the evening of their return from Lava Hot
Springs a counter proposal was signed by the plaintiff and
submitted to Kladis through Fletcher-Lucas Investment Co.
(R. 215-216) and that when the conversation about Teeples
was later reported to him, William Smith stated that he was
not expecting anything different and had a cushion in his
Eighth East property, anyway (R. 262 and 241).
The Court specifically instructed the Jury that the matter
of reliance was a necessary element in establishing the plaintiffs' case (R. 53-55). In addition to this, the jury was confronted with the problem of deciding whom it should believe,
the plaintiff who said he relied on Nate Smith and made no
counter offer, or the defendant Smith, who said the counter
offer was made, but that he could not find the copy of it, and
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that plaintiff did not rely on any statement from him or from
Bishop Teeples. The Jury obviously believed the plaintiff and
believed that Nate Smith and Wayne Carroll and H. E. Baird
(R. 190) were not being truthful.
The plaintiff testified that the trip to Lava Hot Springs
was on December 8th or 9th and Nate Smith believed it was
after December 11th (R. 102, 133, and 216). The plaintiff
believed the trip to Lava was made before there was a written
offer from Kladis (R. 133) and Nate Smith testified that
the trip to Lava was made after the date of the first offer,
Exhibits 1 and 4, and that an offer from Kladis was discussed
with William Smith and made the basis of a counter offer
that very night (R. 215-216, 239).
Exhibit 3 was the listing of the Eighth East property
dated June 30, 1950, by W. F. Smith.
Exhibit 5 was the listing of the Lava property by Nick
Kladis dated December 11, 1950.
Exhibit 4 was an exchange agreement signed by Nick
Kladis, dated December 11, 1950 offering to exchange the
properties at $23,000.00 and $18,000.00 with a balance of
$5,500.00.
Exhibit 1 was an exchange agreement offer signed by
Nick Kladis, dated December 18, 1950, and offering the exchange at $23,000.00 for Eighth East and $15,500.00 for Lava
Hot Springs, subject to a mortgage for the difference. On the
acceptance, the date of December 18, 1950, was crossed out
and January 5, 1951 written in with a signature of W. F. Smith
witnessed by N. A. Smith and made subject to getting a
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$3,000.00 loan on Lava Hot Springs place. This is not signed

by Mrs. Kladis or by Mrs. Smith and there is no acceptance
of the counter proposal by Nick Kladis.
Exihbit 2 consisted of the warranty deed from Kladis to
Smith, the warranty deed from Smith to Kladis, and the mortgage from Smith to Kladis, all dated February 1, 1951 and
representing the consummation of the transaction.
After the trial, according to the affidavits of Nathaniel
Smith and H. E. Baird, (R. 65 and 67), Nate Smith insisted
on a further search for documents which he believed had
been written concerning this transaction, which resulted in
the finding of an old file, away from the other file, in which
additional documents were found and copies presented to
the Court.
These documents consist of: copy of letter of H. E.
Baird to Mr. Kladis, dated December 8, 1950 and enclosing
a photograph of the Eighth East property, listed at $23,000.00,
with a proposal to consider trading at $18,000.00 or a difference of $5,000.00, and inviting Kladis to come to Salt Lake
(R. 69);
Offer from Kladis on exchange agreement form dated
December 11, 1950 and being identical with Exhibit 4;
Additional copy of same exchange agreement offer dated
December 11, 1950, upon which the price of the Lava property
has been erased and reduced to $15,500.00, the amount of
the mortgage has been increased from $5,000.00 to $7,500.00,
and W. F. Smith has signed the acceptance with the notation,
"accepted, subject to terms on reverse side" and on the reverse
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side has been written, "Mr. Kladis to assume present mortgage
on 3031 South Eighth East, Salt Lake City, and made Mr.
Smith a loan of $10,000.00, secured by a first mortgage on
the property in Hot Springs";
An exchange agreement on the same form as Exhibit
1 and appearing to be a carbon copy of Exhibit 1 as it was
originally written, dated December 18, 1950 and signed by
Mr. and Mrs. Kladis and by Mr. and Mrs. Smith, and containing no provision as to a $3,000.00 loan on the Lava Hot
Springs place.
In the testimony at the trial there was no reference by any
of the parties to a proposed $10,000.00 loan, as contained
on the counter offer of Smith dated December 11, 1950, and
there was no testimony by any party or person as to a signed
exchange agreement without an advance of cash by the
Kladisses, as appears from the document presented on the
Motion for New Trial.
This newly discovered evidence would be bound to compel far different testimony from the plaintiff upon a new trial,
as to dates and the making of a counter offer and the reliance
upon representations of value and would also indicate that
the parties were bound by an agreement dated December 18,
1950, and that, thereafter, further negotiations took place
between the parties and that Kladis finally waived his position
under the agreement (R. 223-224) and acceded to the need of
the plaintiff for a loan of money, as shown on Exhibit 1 and as
finally consummated as shown on Exhibit 2. This tends to show
awareness by the plaintiff that the Lava Hot Springs property
was overvalued somewhat and that is why he insisted on the
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loan of $3,000.00 which Kladis finally made, and that the
plaintiff relied on no one but himself in entering into the
exchange agreement.
Furthermore, the letter from H. E. Baird dated December
8, 1950 confirms the time table as testified by Nate Smith,
since on December 8 or 9 Kladis had not yet been advised
of the Smith property and it was of necessity December 15
or 16 that the two Smiths went to Lava Hot Springs. This
means that the exchange agreement dated December 11, 1950
was in their possession, as testified to by Nate Smith, that the
counter offer was made immediately upon their return, and
that on December 18 a new agreement was written up and
signed by all of the parties, the 18th being the Monday following the trip to Lava Hot Springs on Friday, the 15th. It,
therefore, appears that the plaintiff's counter proposal was
acted on almost immediately and that all of the parties gathered
on Monay and signed up the agreement, making plain the
anxiety of the plaintiffs to get the exchange completed and
their satisfaction with the comparative values.
As far as defendant Smith is concerned, the new documents compel a change of his testimony as to the amount of
loan discussed on the way back from Lava Hot Springs to
make it $10,000.00 instead of $5,000.00 and would compel
him to recall the agreement signed by all the parties dated
December 18, 1950 and would further support his testimony
that the plaintiff did not rely upon any recital of value transmitted from Bishop Teeples. The evidence corroborates defendant almost completely and would compel radical changes
in plaintiff's testimony.
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The trial court apparently found that the newly discovered
evidence satisfied the requirements of Rule 59 as to diligence
and materiality and which he summarized by saying the new
evidence indicated "that the plaintiffs had decided to make the
exchange without waiting for the opinion of any Idaho resident," which he speculated might still have permitted the
case to go to the Jury on the theory that the exchange would
have been abandoned or breached had the opinion of Bishop
Teeples been transmitted and the Court was of the opinion
"that the plaintiffs would be very much weaker, and is of the
opinion that the plaintiffs testified they did not sign any documents on the evening of the return from Lava Hot Springs"
(see R. 148) . The Court then indicated that this might justify
the granting of a new trial but understood there would be
further investigation of the documents and further argument
upon the point (R. 76).
On April 22nd, 1958, the Court finally denied the Motion
for New Trial and the Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict
(R. 78) formalized by the Order of May 2, 1958 (R. 79).
Appellants recognize the rule in this state to be that the
trial court has a wide latitude of discretion in granting or
denying motions for new trial. Beck v. Dutchman Coalition
Mines, 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 P. 2d 867; Lindsey v. Eccles Hotel
Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P. 2d 477; Bowden v. Denver & Rio
Grande W. R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 266 P. 2d 240; Trimble
v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674. However,
where required by the showing made or by error in law, this
Court has many times reversed trial judges in their rulings
on Motions for new trial: Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347,
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380, 75 P. 2d 705 at 723 (where newly discovered evidence
was sufficient); Uptown Appliance and Radio Company v.
Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P. 2d 826 (newly discovered evidence
insufficient to warrant new trial); Stamp v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 5 Utah 2d 397, 303 P. 2d 279 (excessive verdict arrived
at as result of passion or prejudice); Pauly v. McCarthy, 109
Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123 (same); Bowden v. D. & R. G. W.
R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 266 P. 2d 240 (court's view of the
law was in error); Haywood v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 6 Utah
2d 155, 307 P. 2d 1045 (law not adequately presented in
instructions); Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176
(granting a new trial for inadequacy of verdict was error).
In Bowden v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., (supra), at page
450 of 3 Utah 2d, this Court thus stated the rule on reversing
the District Court in its judgment on new trials:
"Only when there is error both substantial and prejudicial, and when there is a reasonable likelihood that
the result would have been different without it, should
error be regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment or
grant a new trial."
The Court cited Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil
procedure as noting that a new trial should not be granted
"unless refusal to take such action appears to the Court inconsistent with substantial justice."
In Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. vs. Flint, Supra, this
Court, in reversing the granting of a new trial, indicated the
rule should be followed in determining whether a new trial
should be granted and said:
·'There should be none where no showing is made
of any newly discovered evidence or any other matter
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to indicate that any different evidence would be produced such as could be thought to render a different
result from the one the Jury came to * * * ."
Likewise, in Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P. 2d
264, the Court said:
"A wide discretion is reposed in the trial court in
granting or denying a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. The primary concern of the court
is that justice be done, and the granting of such a
motion is only reviewable in this court on the question
of abuse of discretion. Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255,
53 P. 2d 115 5. True, the exercise of judical discretion
in such instance must be based on a showing of substantial material evidence from which it appears there
is at least a reasonable likelihood that it would affect
the result in a new trial." (P. 124).
In Jensen v. Logan City, Supra, this Court found the
newly discovered evidence to require reversal of the refusal
to grant a new trial and in doing so said:
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital points
in a case is very scant, newly discovered testimony on
that point appearing from affidavit in support of the
motion for a new trial to be apparently reliable, when
it appears that the movant for the new trial was not
guilty of indiligence in failing to obtain the witness
for the trial, and that there is no element of holding
such witness in reserve for purposes of obtaining a
new trial - generally picturesquely denominated in
slang phraseology as-'an ace in the hole'- and it
appears likely that such evidence would change the
result, a new trial should be granted. While the granting or refusing of the motion lies in the sound discretion of the court, where there is grave suspicion
that justice may have miscarried because of the lack
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of enlightenment on a vital point which new evidence
will apparently supply, and the other elements attendant
on obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse of
sound discretion not to grant the same." (P. 380).
It is submitted that the most reliable evidence obtainable
on this type of case and in view of the controversy between
the parties, would have been the documents prepared by the
brokers and signed by parties to the transaction. The trial
judge recognized that these documents would be important
to the jury; and consideration of the documents in the light
of the testimony of the witnesses makes plain the fact that
the oral testimony would necessarily have been vastly different
had these documents been available for cross examination
and much more favorable to the position of the defendant.
A reading of Instructions 7, 8, 9, and 10 and of the
Special Verdict will indicate undue concern for the plaintiffs
with little or no attention paid to the position and the defenses
of the defendants. It was in this atmosphere that the defendants
were compelled to present their Motion for New Trial and
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict. It is submitted that the newly discovered evidence meets the requirements of this Court that "it appears likely that such evidence
would change the result." In the language of an old case:
"A new trial should not be granted upon the ground
of newly discovered evidence unless such evidence is
very clear and satisfactory, and likely to seriously affect
the result, if admitted." Baumgarten v. Hoffman, 9
Utah 338, 34 P. 294.
The newly discovered evidence would show that Mr.
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Baird wrote to Kladis on December 8, 1950 advising him of
a possible trade for the Eighth East home, that Kladis came
to Salt Lake and executed an exchange offer on December
11th, which was taken to Lava Hot Springs by the two Smiths
on Friday, December 15th and that on that very evening
another copy of the December 11th exchange agreement was
used by plaintiff for the purpose of making a counter proposal. Plaintiff, therefore, did not wait for any word from
Bishop Teeples or anyone else but made his counter proposal
because he had seen the property, liked it, and was anxious
to make the exchange. On the following Monday, December
18, 1950 the Kladises came to Salt Lake City and an exchange
agreement was executed by all four of the interested parties,
after Nate Smith had reported to William Smith his conversation with Bishop Teeples of Lava Hot Springs. Or, it
might have been that shortly after the December 18th agreement was signed, Nate Smith reported the conversation to
\~Tilliam Smith; but in any event, the plaintiff thereafter started
to drag his feet and on January 5th signed the exchange
agreement, Exhibit 1, which eventually became the contract
between the parties. This amounted to the loan of $3,000.00
by Kladis and was evidence that plaintiff had good information
on the values of the properties and was insisting on a further
concession by Kladis. With this additional evidence it is not
possible for William Smith to testify that he did not make
<L counter proposal on the return from Lava Hot Springs or
that he waited for word from Lava Hot Springs via Nate
Smith before he went forward. The substantial changes
which the new evidence would necessitate in the testimony
cf Willaim Smith would seriously discredit his entire testi-
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mony. On the other hand, the position of Nate Smith, that
he was making the inquiry as an accommodation to the plaintiff
and that William Smith did not rely on the report, would be
entirely vindicated (R. 115).
This is the case where the newly discovered evidence is
material, goes to substantial points, would make a vast difference in the testimony at a new trial, and would in all probability change the result, as the jury was in doubt anyway (R.

283).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This was a difficult case because plaintiffs abandoned the
only logical action for relief, namely, fraudulent representations by Nate Smith, if in fact there were any misrepresentations
and if in fact the plaintiff relied on them. The trial judge
gave comfort to the plaintiffs in this change of theories and
attempted to instruct the Jury without any reference to fraud
and upon a theory which appeared to be a mixture of breach
of contract and negligent performance of a contract.
The waiver contained in the exchange agreement should
bar plaintiffs from any action except for fraud to avoid the
agreement. Likewise, if Nate Smith misrepresented his conversation with Bishop Teeples and this was done intentionally,
it could properly be reached by an action in deceit for misrepresentation. If Nate Smith acted honestly but negligently,
then he was entitled to have the theory of contributory negligence presented to the Jury, for the reason that if a buyer of
land asks for the opinion of someone who is not known to
be familiar with land values, and if he shows no interest in
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the value of the opinion referred, he would be guilty of contributory negligence.
The oral agreement testified to by William Smith modified
the written employment of the broker and under the Statute
of Frauds must be in writing to be valid and to be the basis
of this action.
And, in any event, and if appellants are wrong on the
foregoing questions of law, it appears plain that there was a
failure of proof as to the plaintiff Patsy Smith and a further
error in directing a verdict for $1, 150.00.
The newly discovered evidence produced from the files
of Fletcher-Lucas Co. fits into the crucial questions of evidence
at the trial and virtually disproves the claims of the plaintiffs,
which tend to show that the plaintiff did not rely on statements of Nate Smith as to the opinions of residents in Lava
Hot Springs, but went ahead on his own judgment and that
the Kladises and the Smiths signed an agreement three days
after the trip to Lava Hot Springs. This evidence would
completely transform the nature and course of the trial and
requires that the Court reverse the judgment of the District
Court and order a new trial of this action with such decision
as to other questions raised herein as the Court believes might
be important in a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS AND BIRD
Attorneys for Defendants
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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